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validity of the position taken, of the logic used to 
support the arguments. Analytical philosophy tends 
to be positive in the sense that it is concerned 
with the clear expression of philosophical thought, 
starting from sense impressions, and applying 
ways of thinking that could broadly be called scien-
tific. But it also is positive in the sense that it gives 
itself a secure and therefore positive position. This 
contrasts with other philosophical traditions that are 
more self-reflexive and self-doubting, where the 
reflection upon the philosopher’s own position not 
only begins to call into question that position in a 
non-positive manner, but also introduces reflexive 
complexities into the argument. These reflexive 
complexities are antithetical to the analytical, 
positive way of proceeding. They tend to undermine 
a linear trajectory of thought in the sense that 
thought will turn back on itself. A proper, analytical 
mode of though, however, does not turn back on 
itself – it proceeds in linear fashion.
This tone and method of proceeding characterises 
Principia Ethica. The book is a ‘general enquiry into 
what is good’,3 and that enquiry is to occur by means 
of analysis. What does it mean to analyse, and what 
can be analysed? Moore considers analysis to be 
the breaking down of things into their more simple 
elements. The task of the philosopher is to take 
complex things and show what they are made up 
of. The rigour of Moore’s thought is evident in the 
first pages of the book, where he quickly draws two 
succinct and apposite conclusions from this. The 
first is that things are generally complex. In order to 
G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica of 1903 marks a 
certain starting point of analytical philosophy.1 Its 
concern with analytical propositions, the pushing of 
analysis to an end point, its rigorous style, the clarity 
of its arguments and the precise demolition of the 
less-than-rigorous work of preceding philosophers 
provided a template for how twentieth century Anglo-
Saxon thought might escape Kantian idealism and 
Hegelian dialectics and forge its own path. It set the 
scene for a style of philosophy that prioritised good 
argument above authority. In this, it laid out for itself 
the whole of philosophy as an almost a-historical 
source of discussion. Moore was not much inter-
ested in the progression of thought, or the idea 
that a particular thought is tied to a particular 
culture or realm of ideas specific to a certain time 
and place. Rather, any idea, from Plato onwards, 
occupies the same intellectual space and is to be 
analysed in itself as more or less valid compared 
to the a-temporal logic of philosophy. Philosophy is 
posited as valid for all times, since it concerns and 
uses logical thought, which is a-temporal. Moore 
already uses the strategy found, for instance, in 
Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy of 
1946, where all philosophies are considered on the 
same plane or the same level, to be compared one 
with another, and their logic and validity weighed in 
the balance compared to the position of the writer.2
The position of the writer, in turn, is given a 
particular weight, and the voice of the writing has 
a particular tone. What distinguishes this tone is 
a certain security, or sense of assurance of the 
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that an end-point of the analysis is reached. This 
end-point is where the analysis reaches something 
simple; that is, something that is not in turn capable 
of being analysed or broken down into smaller 
elements.
I would like here to make two points about this 
procedure of analysis that delves down to simple 
things. The first is to relate it to two possible other 
ways of dealing with what happens when we analyse 
complex things. One other way of characterising 
what happens is precisely to ignore Russell’s theory 
of types and to allow that instead of simple things 
being at the end of the analytical process, what we 
find is something like the paradox of the one who 
says ‘I am lying.’ We could call this a sort of abyssal 
tactic, a tactic of the mise en abyme. One way of 
contrasting analytical philosophy with certain strands 
of continental philosophy is to draw this distinction 
between analysis down to simple elements, and 
analysis down to the paradox or aporia of the mise 
en abyme. For analytical philosophy, this particular 
habit of thought found in continental philosophy is 
unacceptable, and leads to a lack of clarity.
The second way of dealing with what happens 
when we analyse complex things into their compo-
nents is that the process never stops. In that case, 
we would find not a simple thing at the end of the 
analysis, nor a paradox, but rather an analysis that in 
principle is infinite. What is found is a nesting within 
nesting arrangement. What is complex is made up 
of what is also complex, and that in turn complex, to 
infinity. We could call this a sort of logic of multiplic-
ities. What is complex is a multiplicity which in turn 
is made up of other multiplicities, and this nesting of 
multiplicities goes on to infinity. In comparison with 
Moore’s position, this second possible response to 
what happens to analysis at the limit is unacceptable, 
and provides another point of contrast between 
habits of thought that can be found in continental 
philosophy and analytical philosophy. But in respect 
of this distinction, things are more complex. Willard 
be able to analyse something, that thing must have 
a degree of complexity to it that allows it to be taken 
to pieces by philosophy, and its parts put on display. 
A simple thing is not amenable to analysis. Which 
in turns means that we must be careful, according 
to Moore, to ensure that we do not try to analyse 
simple things.
The second conclusion he draws derives from 
the first and from the nature of analysis. As I noted 
above, analytical philosophy is positive in the 
sense that it does not introduce reflexivity into the 
argument or the method of procedure. There is no 
turning back of thought upon itself. This is expressed 
clearly in Russell’s theory of types, which he was 
working out with Alfred North Whitehead at around 
the same time as Moore was working on Principia 
Ethica, and which forms a central thesis of their 
Principia Mathematica.4 The theory of types looks 
at the logical problems that arise when thought 
circles back on itself and starts to make state-
ments about itself. This is most clearly expressed 
by the paradox of the person who says, ‘I am lying.’ 
Here, the reflexive reference back to oneself allows 
such paradoxical and illogical phrases to exist. 
The theory of types introduces a logical hierarchy 
which outlaws such reflexivity by stating that when 
a reference is made to the totality of something 
(the ‘I am’ in the above phrase), this reference 
must be made from a different logical location 
in the hierarchy to that of which the statement is 
made. These different locations in the hierarchy 
are called types.5 The paradox of ‘I am lying’ arises 
because this theory of types is not adhered to, and 
a statement is made that refers to the very position 
from which that statement is uttered. The theory of 
types therefore encourages a linear procedure of 
thought by outlawing this sort of reflexivity.
When analysis proceeds in this linear way, 
starting from complex things and breaking them 
down into their constituent elements, disallowing 
any reflexivity, the consequence, for Moore, is 
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treatise, splits it ‘into seven sections called trattati, 
with the first devoted to “general principles” and the 
next six to “particular” ones, “following the opinion 
of Aristotle in the Physics, where he instructs us 
that in the sciences it is necessary to proceed from 
universals to particulars”’.10 Francesco di Giorgio is 
here only making explicit what had guided the earlier 
theoreticians of architecture – Vitruvius and Leon 
Battista Alberti – in the structuring of their treatises. 
It is therefore possible to make a direct connection 
between the methods and principles of analysis 
that Moore uses, and the origins of architectural 
theory. Architectural theory started by proceeding in 
analytical fashion, splitting, in Aristotle’s terms, what 
is ostensibly ‘plain and obvious’ but in fact ‘confused’, 
into its constituent particular elements. Why are 
these ostensibly obvious things in fact confused? 
For two reasons: firstly, because they are ‘known 
to sense-perception’, and sense perception is 
necessarily imprecise and confused; and secondly, 
because they have not yet been subject to analysis. 
I noted above that analytical philosophy is positive 
in its approach. This point can be clarified further 
by reference to the above quotation from Aristotle. 
A positive approach to knowledge has the following 
characteristics: it proceeds scientifically; it proceeds 
from sense perception; and it proceeds by means of 
analysis. That this is a scientific approach is clear 
from the context within the introduction to Aristotle’s 
Physics, a book that establishes European science. 
That it relates to sense perception, as the thing 
from which one starts, is explicit in the text. As I 
showed above, Quine follows something like this 
principle by saying that in practice we have to point 
to something in order to establish a background 
theory as provisionally effective – that is, we have 
to invoke sense perception. Moore does the same 
thing in Principia Ethica when he talks about the 
colour yellow as being one of these simple things 
which we can only point to but cannot analyse, but 
in contrast to Quine’s later analytical position, he 
gives an absolute rather than provisional validity to 
this.11
Van Orman Quine in his 1968 lecture Ontological 
Relativity states, from firmly within the analytical 
tradition, that all theories rely on a ‘background 
theory’, and that this background theory has ‘its 
own primitively adopted and ultimately inscrutable 
ontology’.6 The reason the background ontology is 
inscrutable is that it reaches simple objects that can 
only be dealt with by ‘something like pointing’, and 
this pointing is precisely what, for Quine, limits the 
‘infinite regress’ of analysis.7 But for Quine this only 
occurs ‘in practice’. In principle, and as the title of his 
essay implies, there is an inherent relativity amongst 
multiple theories such that, just as with Einstein’s 
general relativity regards position and velocity, no 
one theory can be established as absolute, which 
in turn means that ‘it makes no sense to say what 
the objects of a theory are’.8 What we see here is 
an example of how analytical philosophy develops 
beyond its beginning with Moore, since Quine is 
here calling into question the reality of Moore’s 
simple unanalysable things.
Leaving aside such future developments, 
Moore’s procedure of an analysis that delves down 
to simple things – and this is the second of the two 
points I wish to make, in order also to begin to relate 
the discussion to architecture – derives ultimately 
from Aristotle’s Physics, where he states in the first 
paragraphs:
Now what is plain and obvious at first is rather confused 
masses, the elements and principles of which become 
known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance 
from generalities to particulars; for it is a whole that is 
best known to sense-perception, and a generality is a 
kind of whole, comprehending many things within it, 
like parts.9
This Aristotelian principle of advancing from gener-
alities to particulars was invoked early on within 
architectural theory. As John Onians points out in 
Bearers of Meaning, Francesco di Giorgio, in the 
much-improved second version of his architectural 
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theory, that either of the two other tactics for dealing 
with the end (or beginning) of analysis make their 
presence felt within architectural discourse. In that 
sense, it can be said that architectural theory, on the 
whole, has a close although largely unthematised 
relationship with an analytical tradition of thought.
The other issue I wish to raise briefly at this point 
is the status of analysis in relation to architectural 
production. The analytical tradition in philosophy, 
which Moore’s Principia Ethica exemplifies, starts 
from complex things that are to be broken down 
into their elements, until something simple is 
reached. This is a scientific activity, in the sense 
that this method is outlined in Aristotle’s Physics 
and from there influences the whole development 
of European science. The task of architectural 
production is different to this; it is a question not 
of breaking down complex entities, but rather of 
making those complex entities in the first place. It 
is a question of synthesis, not analysis. Or to put it 
in Aristotelian terms, it is a question of poesis – a 
question which he addresses in the Poetics.15 
Of course, the Poetics also proceeds by analysis 
of poetry into various types. But the question of 
the synthesis which poetic creation requires is 
addressed by means of the theme of the unity of 
the plot and the necessity that, just as with other 
arts, poetry must create a unified whole to which 
nothing can be added or removed without disturbing 
its perfection.16 This organic stipulation is taken up 
by Alberti in chapter five of Book Nine of On the Art 
of Building, where he references Aristotle and notes 
that a great work of architecture is one composed 
like an animal ‘following nature’s own example’ 
such that nothing can be added and nothing 
removed without spoiling its perfection.17 I think it 
is worthwhile noting in relation to this whole theme 
of parts, and the perfect and organic wholes into 
which they must be synthesised by the architect, 
that the problem of an organic whole perhaps only 
arises when the premise of an analytical structure 
to thought has already been accepted. In that 
To continue this architectural digression before 
returning to Moore: certain inherent issues are 
therefore raised by virtue of this method of creating 
architectural theories. These inherent issues follow 
from the character of the method. I outlined above 
three methods of dealing with the question of 
the end of analysis. The first of these is Moore’s 
analytical method that I have just pointed to: the 
analysis reaches a simple thing (such as yellow) 
beyond which it cannot go. The aim of analysis 
is to reach such points. The second and third of 
these methods (although method may not be the 
correct word here) are alien to Moore’s analytical 
philosophy and take respectively the reflexive 
mise en abyme approach and the infinite nesting, 
or multiplicity approach. Now it is interesting to 
note that a common trope of traditional architec-
tural theory is to invoke some simple origin of the 
discipline. This is evident, for instance, in Vitruvius 
and Alberti, where the origins of architecture are 
posited in some primordial situation such as the 
need to provide shelter, or the gathering of people 
around a fire.12 It is evident in Abbé Marc-Antoine 
Laugier’s primitive hut.13 It is evident in Gottfried 
Semper’s similar invocations of fire and the hearth 
in The Four Elements of Architecture.14 All these are 
myths of the origin of architecture; they are attempts 
to sort out the issue of where it starts, temporally 
speaking. Equally, where the analysis of archi-
tecture can stop, logically speaking. They address 
the problem: if our task is analysis, at what point 
does that analysis begin or end? Furthermore, the 
myth has necessarily to invoke a simple or primitive 
situation. The primitive hut, the primitive situation 
of the gathering around the fire, the primitive and 
straightforward need for shelter: these may appear 
to have a historical logic to them, but, of course, 
they do not, in the sense that there is no possible 
historical evidence for these myths. Rather, they are 
fulfilling a logical need that flows from the premise 
that a discussion of architecture must proceed in an 
Aristotelian and analytical manner. It is only rarely, 
and only in late twentieth-century architectural 
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good? It cannot substitute for that question another 
question. In that sense, the judgment about what 
is good is a primitive judgment, and comes at the 
end of analysis rather than at the beginning. No 
analysis, strictly speaking, of the good can occur, 
for the same reason that no analysis of yellow can 
occur; all analysis will have preceded this point. 
It becomes apparent that one important aspect 
of analytical philosophy is that it is and should be 
conscious of its limitations. This is a characteristic it 
shares with all positive science, in the sense that a 
science, properly speaking, defines the limits of its 
knowledge and agrees not to attempt to go beyond 
those limits.20 So, for instance, it can be said that the 
modern forecasting of weather is a science not only 
because it is capable of predicting, within certain 
boundaries, what the weather will be tomorrow, but 
also because it acknowledges that, as a science, 
it cannot predict what the weather will be like in a 
month’s time. For science, this setting out of limita-
tions is not a negative aspect but rather a positive 
aspect of its self-understanding.21 The same goes 
for Moore’s definition of the good as unanalysable; 
what may appear to be a negative limitation in fact 
allows Moore to say something important about the 
nature of ethical judgments – namely, their irreduci-
bility. It is not possible to reduce an ethical judgment 
to some other criteria. Or rather, this should not 
be done. There is an ethical call here to avoid the 
naturalistic fallacy and therefore to acknowledge, in 
any judgment about what is good, that this judgment 
cannot and must not be reduced to other criteria. 
It does not take very much thought to realise the 
importance of this point; it represents in abstract, 
for instance, the distinction between the question 
of law and the question of justice. Law is precisely 
the reduction of questions of the good to sets of 
normative rules; but beyond that there is always the 
question of justice, which represents the irreduc-
ibility of the good to such rules.
Now this seems to me to raise important issues 
in relation to architectural judgments. When are 
sense, it may be necessary to be wary of the ease 
with which architectural theory tends to transform 
an instrument of analysis into an instrument of 
production.18 Perhaps the question of the creation 
of architecture (or anything new) needs to be looked 
at on its own terms.
I stated above that, for Moore, an end-point of 
analysis is reached when something simple is found 
or understood; that is, something that is not in turn 
capable of being analysed or broken down into 
smaller elements. He gives the example of yellow as 
something simple which cannot be further analysed 
and instead has to be pointed to in order that it 
be understood. It is central to Moore’s argument 
in Principia Ethica that the good is, similarly and 
essentially, something simple. This is a conclusion 
that he presents in the first chapter of the book, 
admitting that this may appear to be a disappointing 
result in the context of a discussion about ethics. In 
fact, this point is crucial to an understanding of the 
nature of ethics, because what Moore wants above 
all else to falsify is what he calls the ‘naturalistic 
fallacy’ about the question of the good:
a mistake of this simple kind has commonly been 
made about 'good'. It may be true that all things which 
are good are also something else, just as it is true that 
all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of 
vibration in the light. And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at 
discovering what are those other properties belonging 
to all things which are good. But far too many philos-
ophers have thought that when they named those 
other properties they were actually defining good; that 
these properties, in fact, were simply not 'other', but 
absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This 
view I propose to call the 'naturalistic fallacy'.19
The naturalistic fallacy is the habit of believing 
that something else can be put in the place of the 
good. In other words, and to look at it from the 
other direction: a judgment about what is good 
has to consider simply that very question: is it 
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necessary to give criteria in order that judgments 
can be made. What Moore is telling us is that, 
ultimately, the judgment about what is good is a 
judgment which has to stand alone, unsupported by 
the scaffolding of rules, styles, or ideas. This implies 
in turn that to say that a work of architecture is good 
has, potentially, a validity in itself that is difficult, or 
impossible in principle, to analyse out into other 
criteria. Yes, we can constructively analyse such 
matters as the historic and biographic conditions that 
give rise to a judgment of the good, but in principle 
the judgment itself stands alone. Looking from the 
other direction of the production of architecture, 
we can say that the production of a good work can 
never be pre-determined by way of rules or criteria, 
assuming that we acknowledge that a – possibly 
ongoing – self-critical judgment about what is good 
is a necessary part of creative production. That is to 
say, if pre-determined criteria are used in the action 
of designing architecture, then we can be sure that 
the best architecture is not being created. Moore 
expresses this in general terms when he points to 
the limitations of duty – that is, the limitations of 
acting in accordance with certain criteria: ‘it follows 
that we never have any reason to suppose that an 
action is our duty: we can never be sure that any 
action will produce the greatest value possible’.23
Is there perhaps a confusion here between 
different meanings of the word good? Are we mixing 
up two different things – good as in a properly 
ethical judgment, and good as in an aesthetic 
judgment? One interesting thing about Moore’s 
philosophy is his habit of evening out the implied 
ontology. He tends to treat all instances of the word 
good as referring back to one common thing, as 
if the name has an inherent power. It is as if the 
things that may be called good are not to be distin-
guished one amongst the other as regards their 
ultimate characteristics. They are all of one kind. 
Thus, in principle, it seems that for Moore ethics 
treats of all aspects of the good, be they moral or 
aesthetic questions. It does not matter whether we 
architectural judgments made? They have to be 
made all the time both in relation to architectural 
production and in relation to architectural criticism. 
They have to be made by those who are designing 
architecture (commonly, architects), by those who 
then allow architecture to exist (commonly, disci-
plines such as town planning), and by those who 
subsequently critique architecture. They have to 
be made in the academic studio, where judgments 
have to be made to guide students towards what 
is good design, and then to assess their work. It 
is easy to see that there is a whole history to be 
written of how the question of what is good archi-
tecture gets reduced to other criteria. These 
criteria are commonly stylistic: it is common to 
find within the history of architectural criticism that 
good architecture is equated with a certain, often 
contemporary, style. As commonly, the criteria are 
technical, not only in the sense that architecture 
is required to fulfil some overtly technical require-
ments, but also in the sense that attempts are made 
to codify what will constitute good architecture – for 
instance, within planning systems. Often, criteria 
are implicit rather than explicit: an example of this 
is the use of photography in architectural criticism, 
whereby what photographs well and presents a 
good visual aspect is judged to be good per se. 
Sometimes the criteria are philosophical, as when 
Alberti states that architecture is something that has 
an idea in the sense that the Aristotelian perfection 
and wholeness of great architecture (nothing to 
be added or removed) has to be preconceived 
and determined in the mind of the architect.22 For 
Alberti, an architectural judgment about the good 
lies behind the very definition of architecture, since 
this is what distinguishes it from mere building.
What Moore’s critique of the naturalistic fallacy 
implies is that this reduction of what is good in 
architecture – or what is good architecture, or what 
is architecture – to certain criteria other than the 
outcome of a judgment about the good, is not to be 
trusted. It is obvious that for pragmatic reasons it is 
17
But Moore’s uniqueness here lies in the manner 
in which he defines these ultimate good things. The 
fact that they are complex is taken to be a matter 
worthy, in itself, of analysis and philosophical inves-
tigation. The nature of this complexity is outlined 
in the very terms that Moore uses: the enjoyment 
or consciousness of a beautiful object, and the 
pleasures of human intercourse. It is the intermixture 
of the subject who is contemplating the beautiful (or 
fellow human) with the beautiful thing (or human) 
itself which is of concern to Moore. It is this inter-
mixture that makes up an organic whole, it is this 
intermixture that is the object of his analysis, and it 
is this mixture that is, for him, good. The subject, or 
the beautiful object, are merely parts of this unified 
or organic whole. This means that, in themselves, 
the subject, or the beautiful object, or any other 
aspect of these wholes which Moore has identified, 
are not necessarily good, or at least do not have 
anywhere near as much good as the whole of which 
they are a part. This is a resolutely non-objective 
notion of the goodness of both a moral situation and 
the goodness of a beautiful thing, because this thing 
which is beautiful is stripped of its objective qualities 
(i.e. any quality it has as an object per se) and 
instead given a relational reality. As Moore says:
[the] mere existence of what is beautiful has value, so 
small as to be negligible, in comparison with that which 
attaches to the consciousness of beauty. This simple 
truth may, indeed, be said to be universally recog-
nised. What has not been recognised is that it is the 
ultimate and fundamental truth of Moral Philosophy. 
That it is only for the sake of these things – in order 
that as much of them as possible may at some time 
exist – that any one can be justified in performing 
any public or private duty; that they are the raison 
d’être of virtue; that it is they – these complex wholes 
themselves, and not any constituent or character-
istic of them – that form the rational ultimate end of 
human action and the sole criterion of social progress: 
these appear to be truths which have been generally 
overlooked.27
are asking about the good of something beautiful, or 
the good of something moral: in both instances, the 
unreducible thing we are asking about is the same 
thing, the same good; and this good is an ‘unana-
lysable object of thought’.24 Perhaps, indeed, its 
unanalysable quality is what allows it to pass across 
the boundaries of the beautiful and the moral; 
perhaps its apparently nominal quality is actually its 
resistance to analysis.
Principia Ethica ends with an extraordinary 
chapter on the question of the ideal. This Moore 
defines as not just the question of what is good 
(which the whole book addresses), but the question 
of the ultimate good. What, above all else, is 
ultimately good? Moore’s answer revolves around 
a discussion of the concept of ‘unified’ or ‘organic 
wholes’. While the good, in itself, is simple and 
unanalysable, the things that we can judge to be 
good are inherently complex, and are therefore 
things that can be analysed in themselves. But 
because the good is simple and unanalysable, 
and because there is no recourse to the naturalist 
fallacy whereby it would be possible to give criteria 
for the good, the judgment about what is the highest 
good or what is ultimately good in turn becomes 
something that can merely be asserted rather than 
explained. One of the more controversial aspects 
of the book is that Moore baldly states, in this last 
chapter, that the two highest forms of good are the 
enjoyment or contemplation of beautiful objects, 
and the pleasures of human intercourse.25 The 
point I made above holds: he sees no intrinsic 
difference between moral good and aesthetic good; 
both are the rightful topic of ethics, and indeed the 
consciousness and contemplation of the beautiful 
is ranked above types of moral good that do not 
consist in the pleasures of human intercourse. And 
he does not attempt to justify his judgment about 
these two highest forms of good: indeed he makes 
the point that this judgment appears so obvious as 
to run the risk of ‘seeming to be a platitude’.26
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of which it is a particle. The example he gives is 
the representation of a landscape in a painting, as 
compared to the landscape itself. Both these things, 
in themselves – in their objecthood – have no or 
little intrinsic value. So a landscape, in itself, or a 
painting, in itself, have little value. What is valued is 
the larger whole which consists of the painting or the 
landscape in combination with the consciousness 
which someone has of either of these things. Moore 
then asks what implication the existence of the 
landscape has for these organic wholes, since in 
the instance of the painting the landscape is not in 
existence, whereas in the instance of the landscape 
it is. His answer is that although existence per se 
is not something of great value, when existence is 
added to a good whole of which it may be a part, this 
addition increases the good of that organic whole. 
This means that the experience of a landscape is 
a higher good than an experience of the represen-
tation of a landscape.
It is of course possible, from our vantage point, 
to criticise this logic by pointing out that Moore is 
not comparing like with like, and that in fact what 
should be considered in the case of the painting is 
not the non-existence of landscape it represented, 
but rather the existence of the painting itself as a 
work. This however does not affect the point I wish 
to make here, which is that Moore is valuing organic 
wholes which consist of the intermixture of a person 
with an environment or an object in existence more 
than intermixtures where the contemplated thing is 
represented rather than really existing. This implies 
a general depreciation of representational situa-
tions relative to non-representational situations. 
I wish to argue here that Moore’s notion of the 
organic whole, together with his concern for the 
goodness of human intercourse (another organic 
whole, consisting of more than one subject), 
are potentially inherently architectural thoughts 
with significant implications for the theory and 
ontology of architecture. Moore’s emphasis on the 
Moore follows through the implications of his ethical 
mereology (the branch of philosophy dealing with 
the question of parts and wholes) by insisting that 
the value of the whole is not related to the value 
of the parts in any way. So a whole which is very 
good can be made up of parts which, of themselves, 
do not have anything particularly good about them. 
An example of this is the part that we call material. 
Moore states that in itself, material does not have 
anything good about it; it is not something about 
which an ethical judgment would commonly be 
made. In itself, it is mundane. But in combination 
with other things, where it helps to make up an 
organic whole of a certain type, it contributes to 
the goodness of that whole thing, and indeed 
without that material quality – in itself of no or 
little value – the organic whole would not have by 
any means the same amount of goodness about 
it. Some parts that individually have little or no 
value in themselves can and do combine to create 
something of great value: the material and bodily 
qualities of things are a vital component of beauty, 
even though material considered in itself does not 
have any inherent value.28
One of the parts of an organic whole that Moore 
considers is the part called existence. (Again, we 
see here a sort of flat ontology, whereby things that 
are usually kept in separate realms of thought are, 
in Moore, given equal weight. A part of a complex 
whole can for him be existence itself, or the lack 
of it; it can be the consciousness which someone 
has of something; it can be that thing considered 
only as an object; it can be the material or the 
colour; or it could be something more ephemeral 
still such as the memories one has of something, 
or the history of the object or situation. All these 
things are potentially and really parts or let us 
say particles of these larger organic wholes that 
are given value not because these particles have 
value, but because their intermixture does.) He 
considers the extent to which the real existence of 
something contributes to the goodness of the whole 
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Taking this thought further with respect to the 
question of existence and materiality, I would argue 
that the complex whole of architecture, in order to 
aspire to the ultimate good, would need to incor-
porate into itself particles of these things too. The 
complex whole of architecture should include the 
brute and material existence of the object, so that 
this whole includes not just a contemplation of the 
building (which would be possible with drawn or 
otherwise represented projects) but also an inhabi-
tation and material interplay with it. The particles of 
which the complex whole of architecture consists 
should include not only the subject who contem-
plates, the object they are contemplating, and the 
ideational interplay between them, but also the 
inhabitation or other material interplay that can 
occur when the building is built. If we regard archi-
tecture in this way – if this is, for us, its ontology, 
its way of being – then the possible good of archi-
tecture is greater than if these particles of existence, 
matter and interplay did not exist within the complex 
whole. Again, according to Moore, existence and 
matter considered in themselves do not necessarily 
have anything good about them. It is only in their 
co-existence within the whole that they cause or 
allow that whole to be better than it might otherwise 
be.
The fertility of Moore’s thought for a rich notion 
of architecture seems to me to be exemplified by 
his championing of two ultimate goods – the good 
of the contemplation of the beautiful, and the good 
of the pleasures of human intercourse. These are 
regarded as potentially equally good. One criticism 
that can be made of the last chapter of Principia 
Ethica is that having made this assertion, Moore 
spends time dealing with the former, but very 
little time outlining what the implications of the 
pleasures of human intercourse are. In relation to 
the complex whole of architecture, however, some 
clear conclusions can be reached. Yes, architecture 
is the involvement or implication of various particles 
such as existence, matter, the building and its 
intermixture of the work and the subject, his interest 
in the material quality of things, his championing of 
the apparently mundane if seen within a broader 
context, his doubts about representational art 
compared to environmental beauty, and his valuing 
of the sociability of human intercourse all point to a 
rich concept of what architecture can be, or can be 
considered to be. For what, after all, is architecture 
such that it is something good? What ontology of 
architecture can lend itself to Moore’s question: 
what, above all else, is ultimately good? And I would 
wish to take this question in both the senses that 
his notion of the good allows: in a moral sense and 
in the sense of beauty. Both these aspects seem to 
me to be pertinent to an ethics of architecture.
The first and most important implication for 
architectural ontology is that if architecture is to be 
good, then it cannot be of the nature of an object 
but has to be of the nature of one of these organic 
wholes which Moore posits. More specifically, it 
must combine both the object – that is, we could 
say in the interests of terminological consistency, 
the building – and the appreciation of that building 
by those who come to contemplate it. Architecture, 
in other words, does not have the type of existence 
that an object has; architecture is something 
entirely different to a building. Architecture is (I am 
suggesting, provisionally) the complex whole made 
up of the building and those who come to contem-
plate it. This means that ontologies of architecture 
which take as read that architecture is a subset of 
buildings or objects, such as those that consider 
architecture defined in a formal manner, would be 
seen to be reducing the possibilities of both an ethics 
of architecture and the ontology of architecture. 
Architecture, considered as form, and taking into 
account Moore’s theory of complex wholes, is an 
impoverished thing. Rather, the highest good could 
only have a chance of taking hold in architecture 
if it is defined as a complex whole that inherently 
involves the subject.
20
architecture.) Seen in the light of this traditional 
architectural-theoretical approach, taking its lead 
from Aristotle and the progression from generalities 
to particulars and which therefore analyses complex 
wholes into their constituent elements, the placing 
together of these various particles makes little 
sense. We are at the end of a several thousand-year 
history of taking things to pieces. This analytical 
contemplation of things has an effect; specifically 
it has an ontological effect, since architecture has 
come to be defined within this analytical framework 
not as a complex whole, but rather as one of the 
more simple parts of it. This ontology in turn 
affects the production of architecture, since what 
is conceived during its production is influenced and 
underpinned by that ontology, whether that ontology 
is acknowledged or not. And the less the presuppo-
sitions implicit in an ontology are acknowledged and 
understood, the more powerful and influential those 
presuppositions are. It matters what is intended 
when we speak about architecture; it matters what 
the architect intends when she decides to design. 
It is a very different thing to intend a building – an 
object – than to intend a multiplicity, a complex 
whole of which buildings are a necessary but by no 
means sufficient part.
As we saw above, Moore’s Principia Ethica repre-
sents, in some sense, the ‘birth’ of the analytical 
traditional in philosophy. It is therefore something of 
a paradox that it is precisely in this book that we 
find the tool to begin to undo or go beyond what 
analysis, since Aristotle, has achieved. This simple 
tool – the thought of complex wholes – together with 
the raising of two types of complex wholes – the 
contemplation of the beautiful and the pleasures of 
human intercourse – to the ultimate good, provide 
us with a clue to establish not the origins of archi-
tecture, but rather its ontology, its character, its 
mode of existence here and now, and always.
Moore’s insights do, however, seem to me to 
require one point of critique and one instance of 
contemplation with the person who comes to inhabit 
or otherwise engage with them; but we need to go 
further than this. There is an inherently social nature 
to this architectural complex whole. In other words, 
in Moore’s terms, this complex whole must and 
should include within it, in order to become as good 
as it can be, in order to aspire to the highest good, 
the pleasures of human intercourse. The pleasures 
of human intercourse is itself a complex whole 
made up of more than one human being, and this 
complex whole is perforce of greater value than the 
individual existence of one human being. In turn, I 
am arguing that this complex whole should be and 
commonly is a part of a greater complex whole 
of architecture. In other words, that architecture 
includes within it, as a particle helping to make it up, 
the pleasures of human intercourse as well as the 
aforementioned other particles such as existence, 
matter, building, the individual, the contemplation 
of these things and the material interplay or inhabi-
tation with these things. This returns us to Vitruvius, 
Alberti, Laugier and Semper: what distinguishes 
their myths of the origins of architecture is that 
they refer to the social, to the ‘pleasures of human 
intercourse’, to the ‘concourse of mankind’ (in eo 
hominum congressu) as Vitruvius puts it, around 
the fire or the hearth or in the act of creating the 
first shelter.29 It is as if, in following an analysis of 
architecture which splits it into parts, architectural 
theory must then resort to myth and origins in order 
to invoke what is in fact, according to the ontology I 
am outlining here, always already and even now a 
constituent part of it.
What is the possible use of such a conception 
or ontology of architecture? (What difference, in the 
end, is there between a conception of architecture 
and an ontology of architecture? An ontology is 
what a thing is, the way in which it exists. For us, 
something exists only for us and in relation to us. 
Therefore, our conception of a thing determines the 
ontology of that thing. In other words, we have some 
potential control over the ontology of something like 
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manner in which Moore defines them), then nothing 
prevents that larger multiplicity (which I have called 
architecture) from being, or being seen as, part of 
still larger multiplicities. Further, there is nothing 
to say that this structure only applies at a certain 
mid-sized scale. It may be that in our common ways 
of thinking we concentrate on medium-sized things, 
but in principle this nesting of one complex entity 
into another goes on to embrace everything. I would 
like to suggest, as the conclusion to this essay, 
that architecture can thereby be for us something 
opening out onto the cosmos as a whole, by virtue 
of this infinite containing of complex individuals 
within still broader complex multiplicities – a nesting 
to infinity that enables us to catch a glimpse of the 
cosmic ontology of architecture.
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